# PIPELINE.md — the CIS490 generative pipeline honesty plan

**This document is canonical.** It supersedes any guidance in
`AGENTS.md`, `FIXYOURSELF.md`, `README.md`, or other repo docs that
contradicts it. If another doc says something different, this doc wins
and the other doc is wrong (file an issue or fix it).

This is not an architecture overview. This is a fix list. Read it,
implement it, do not split it into phases.

**Before proposing any change to the pipeline, re-read §1, §7, and §8
and run your proposal against §8's checklist.** Then proceed.

---

## 1. Principle

Every episode that reaches the dataset must be ground-truth. Every
host runs the same experiment with the same configured catalog. Every
exploit module and every collector in the catalog has been proven to
work end-to-end before it is eligible to run. There are no
compensating layers — no auto-update timers that drag stale peers
forward, no "fix-yourself" decision trees, no per-host divergence
absorbed by trainer-side filters, no labels written by clock when the
event they describe didn't happen.

If a host can't meet the bar, it produces zero episodes and says so
loudly. A small honest dataset beats a large dishonest one.

**Default to removal, not addition.** If a problem can be fixed by
deleting code or removing a layer, prefer that. Adding a layer is
the suspect default and should be justified against §7 and §8 before
proceeding.

---

## 2. What the experiments are for

CIS490 trains a behavioral malware-detection model. The dataset is
the ground-truth labelled record of what the host looked like during
known-clean, known-armed, known-infecting, and known-infected phases
of a real exploit chain against a real target service. The model
learns to distinguish those phases from in-deployment
behavior. **Every dishonest label is a poisoned training example.**

This is why the producer's job is not "ship lots of episodes." It is
"ship episodes whose labels are true."

---

## 3. What is currently broken (evidence)

Numbers from the 200-episode quality probe on 2026-05-03:

1. **Labels lie.** 0 of 67 Tier-3 exploit fires resulted in a
   `session_open` event. All 67 logged `session_open_timeout`. Yet
   every one of those 67 episodes is labelled
   `phase=infected_running` because the schedule-driven labeller
   transitions on a clock, not on observed events. The
   `infected_running` label in the dataset means "the schedule said
   so," not "an attacker session was actually open on this host."
2. **Collectors are silent.**
   - `perf` produces 0 rows on 100% of episodes on both hosts.
   - `guest-agent` produces 0 rows on 100% of episodes on both hosts.
   - `qmp`, `netflow`, and `pcap` produce 0 rows on 100% of
     k-gamingcom episodes (different config from elliott).
   - The host `tcpdump` is missing on k-gamingcom; `pcap_unavailable`
     is logged then ignored.
3. **The catalog is unverified.** Modules are added to the rotation
   without a per-module verification that the module actually lands a
   session against its declared target. `samba_usermap_script` has a
   100% failure rate against the configured Metasploitable2 target
   and was still in the rotation.
4. **Hosts run divergent experiments.** elliott and k-gamingcom have
   different per-host manifests, different collector coverage,
   different qemu invocations. The dataset is a union of two
   different experiments, not 200 samples from one.
5. **Working trees are dirty.** 200/200 episodes report `dirty=true`,
   so `code_version.commit` is unverifiable provenance.

Each of these is a failure of the producer. Receiver-side filtering
and trainer-side prune scripts are bandaids that hide them.

---

## 4. The fix — line items

Every item below must land. They are not phases. They are parts of
one cohesive correctness story; any of them missing leaves the
pipeline half-honest. Each item names its acceptance test.

### 4.1 Canonical manifest

There is exactly one manifest, version-pinned in the repo at
`manifest.toml`. Every lab host loads the same manifest. There is no
per-host manifest override, no per-host collector enable/disable
flag, no per-host qemu argument list. Hosts that cannot run the
canonical manifest exit 78 at orchestrator startup.

**Acceptance:** `find . -name manifest.toml -not -path './.git/*'`
returns exactly one path. There is no `--manifest` CLI flag on the
orchestrator that takes a different path; the path is hard-coded.
Removing this line item would re-create the host divergence we just
exited.

### 4.2 Target VMs we build, not VMs we fetch

Every target VM image is built from a declarative spec checked into
the repo (Packer, mkosi, debootstrap, whatever — declarative). The
image build produces a sha256-pinned artifact. The build script
verifies, before producing the artifact, that:

- The vulnerable service is up after first boot.
- The service is on the port the module catalog declares.
- The service version matches the version the module catalog
  declares.

`Metasploitable2` from a SourceForge mirror is removed. We don't
ship episodes targeting black-box images.

**Acceptance:** `scripts/build-target-<name>.sh` exists for every
target referenced by an exploit module. Running it produces an image
whose post-boot state passes the spec's verification step. The
verification step's exit code gates the build's exit code.

### 4.3 Module catalog admission criteria

A module is in the catalog *only if* it passes a recorded end-to-end
verification run against its declared target. The verification is:

1. Boot the target snapshot.
2. Fire the module via msfrpcd.
3. Observe a `session_open` event (not `session_open_timeout`).
4. Observe at least one shell command round-trip on the session.
5. Confirm guest-side artifact (file written, process spawned —
   per-module).

If any step fails, the module does not enter the catalog. There is
no "tentatively included" tier. Modules already in the catalog are
re-verified by `scripts/verify-catalog.sh` (new) on every release;
failures remove the module from the catalog.

**Acceptance:** every entry in `exploits/modules/*.toml` has a
companion `verified_against = "<target_name>"` and
`last_verified = "<commit_sha>"` field. `scripts/verify-catalog.sh`
re-runs every entry and exits 0 only if every one passes.

### 4.4 Collector admission criteria

A collector is in the active set *only if* it passes a recorded
end-to-end verification run that confirms it emits non-zero rows
against a known-busy probe workload.

For each of the six collectors (`proc`, `qmp`, `netflow`, `perf`,
`guest`, `pcap`):

1. Diagnose the current zero-row failure (read the code, run
   standalone, find the actual cause). Fix the cause.
2. Add a unit-or-integration test that runs the collector for N
   seconds against a synthesized workload (a busy-loop process for
   `proc`/`perf`, a packet generator for `netflow`/`pcap`, a QMP
   blockstats query for `qmp`, a guest heartbeat for `guest`) and
   asserts ≥1 row.
3. The test must run in CI and on every install via the install
   script.

A collector that cannot pass admission is removed from the active
set with a recorded reason — not silently included with zero rows.

**Acceptance:** `pytest tests/test_collectors_emit.py -k <name>`
passes for each name. The CI run gates merges.

### 4.5 Event-driven labelling

Phase labels are written from observed events, never from the
schedule clock. The schedule becomes a *time budget* — maximum time
the orchestrator will wait in each phase — not a label source.

Specifically:

- `clean` is written at episode start.
- `armed` is written when the orchestrator instructs the driver to
  fire (this is observable in code).
- `infecting` is written when the `exploit_fire` event is observed.
- `infected_running` is written **only** when the `session_open`
  event is observed.
- If `session_open_timeout` is observed instead, the episode
  terminates with a `failed` label and is rejected (see §4.6).
- `dormant` and subsequent `infected_running` transitions are
  written from observed in-session idle / activity, not from clock.

Per-module timeouts replace the global 30s timeout. Default 120s,
configurable per module in `exploits/modules/*.toml`.

**Acceptance:** for every shipped episode, every entry in
`labels.jsonl` has a corresponding event in `events.jsonl` with a
matching `t_mono_ns` within ±100ms. An invariant test asserts this.

### 4.6 Episode acceptance gate at finalization

Before sealing meta and writing `done.marker`, the orchestrator
verifies:

- Every collector in the active set produced ≥1 row.
- Every label has a matching event (§4.5 invariant).
- For Tier-3 episodes: a `session_open` event exists.
- `dirty=true` is absent OR `dirty_override=true` is present (see
  §4.9).

If any check fails, the episode goes to `data/rejected/<id>/` with a
`rejected_reason.json` describing which check failed. `done.marker`
is not written. The shipper never sees it.

**Acceptance:** `tests/test_acceptance_gate.py` covers each rejection
condition. A passing test asserts a clean episode is accepted; for
each failure mode, the test asserts the episode is moved to
`rejected/` with the expected reason.

### 4.7 Producer preflight

`orchestrator/preflight.py` runs at orchestrator startup. One bar
(no light/deep split). Checks:

- Every binary required by the active collector set + active module
  catalog is on `PATH`.
- `/dev/kvm` accessible by the service user.
- `kernel.perf_event_paranoid <= 2`.
- `cfg.bridge_iface` exists; `tcpdump` can capture on it.
- `msfrpcd` reachable; `auth.login` returns a token.
- For every module in catalog: `module.info` is fetchable.
- For every sample in catalog: file present on disk; sha256 matches.
- Probe-boot baseline-v1 snapshot; observe guest-agent heartbeat
  within N seconds.
- `git status --porcelain` empty (or `CIS490_ALLOW_DIRTY=1`).
- HEAD is on a commit currently in `origin/main`.

Failures are collected (every failed check logged with diagnosis +
remediation), then `sys.exit(78)`.

**Acceptance:** `tests/test_preflight.py` covers each check
individually with mocked subprocess/filesystem. `python -m
orchestrator.preflight` runs the checks and prints a structured
report. Exit codes: 0 ok, 78 sysadmin error.

### 4.8 Receiver-side rejection (defense in depth)

**The receiver is defense-in-depth, NOT the primary correctness
mechanism.** The producer is. Receiver rejection exists to catch
peers running stale or broken code; it is never a substitute for
fixing the producer. A change that strengthens receiver rejection
without strengthening the producer is the defensive-instead-of-
corrective pattern (§7.9).

The receiver enforces the same correctness invariants the
orchestrator does. A peer running stale code that produces dishonest
episodes still gets rejected at ingest:

- Reject any meta with `dirty=true` and no `dirty_override=true`.
- Reject any meta where `phases_observed` contains `infected_running`
  but `events.jsonl` (extracted from the tarball) lacks
  `session_open`.
- Reject any meta where any configured-collector row count is zero.
- Existing commit-allow-list gate continues.

Rejections return 422 with a JSON body naming the failed check.
Rejected tarballs are not written to the index.

**Acceptance:** `tests/test_receiver_rejects.py` covers each new
rejection condition.

### 4.9 Override discipline

The only escape hatch from the dirty-tree gate is the
`CIS490_ALLOW_DIRTY=1` environment variable. When set:

- Orchestrator logs `WARN: dirty tree override active`.
- meta.json gains `dirty_override: true`.
- Receiver accepts the episode only if `dirty_override` is also
  `true`.
- Every override use is auditable from the dataset.

There are no other override knobs. No `verify_tls=false`, no "skip
preflight," no "include this collector even if it emits zero rows."

### 4.10 Regression-test discipline

Every fix in this plan lands with a test that would have caught the
regression at PR time. Tests are not a follow-up. A PR that fixes
the perf collector without a perf-emit test is incomplete and gets
sent back.

CI runs:
- All unit tests.
- `scripts/verify-catalog.sh` against a smoke target subset (catalog
  verification full run is gated to release commits — too expensive
  for every PR).
- The collector-emit integration tests (§4.4) on real binaries.

### 4.11 systemd integration

- `cis490-orchestrator.service` adds
  `RestartPreventExitStatus=78`. A preflight failure stays loud and
  stuck instead of cycling restarts.
- On preflight failure, orchestrator writes
  `/var/lib/cis490/preflight.failed.json` with the failed checks +
  timestamps. Doctor surfaces this in its next report. The
  fleet-health alert distinguishes "preflight failed" from "host
  silent."

### 4.12 Cleanup of compensating layers

The following are deleted as part of this change. Their existence
was load-bearing for the dishonest pipeline; the honest one doesn't
need them.

- `FIXYOURSELF.md` — entire file deleted. Stuck states no longer
  exist as a class because the gates make them impossible.
- `cis490-autoupdate.timer` + `scripts/auto-update.sh` — deleted.
  Hosts run pinned commits. New code is rolled out by the operator,
  not auto-pulled.
- `cis490-cert-fetch.timer` — replaced by a one-shot first-boot
  fetch in `install-lab-host.sh`. No periodic re-fetch.
- `tools/quarantine_unstamped.py` — deleted. Pre-stamp episodes
  cannot exist because no episode is written without a valid stamp.
- `tools/check_fleet_health.py` — keep, but delete the "fatal-only"
  alert branch (that branch existed because we were shipping fatals;
  with the gate, we don't).
- `tools/prune_episodes.py`'s "kept episode despite flat /proc
  because qmp showed write" cross-check logic — deleted. Episodes
  that don't pass the producer-side gate don't reach the trainer.
- AGENTS.md "symptom→fix table" — deleted (the
  symptoms it covers are now impossible).
- AGENTS.md "Hosts self-update" section — deleted.

### 4.13 Containment bar

Real malware execution requires explicit containment. Target VMs
exist in an isolation context that is part of the canonical
experiment, not a deployment detail. A future change that weakens
any of the items below is a containment regression and is rejected
regardless of what experimental realism it claims to add.

For every target VM in the catalog (§4.2):

- **Network:** target attaches to a bridge with NO upstream egress.
  No NAT to the host network, no internet route, no DNS resolution
  beyond what the experiment provides. Outbound C2 callbacks
  resolve to a sinkhole inside the experiment, never to the
  internet.
- **Filesystem:** no shared mount with the host. No 9p, no
  virtio-fs with host paths. The target's disk is the snapshot it
  was booted from, period.
- **Privilege:** QEMU runs as the unprivileged service user. KVM
  access is via group membership only; no setuid wrappers, no
  privileged TUN ownership transfer, no passthrough of host
  devices not explicitly required by the catalog.
- **Lifetime:** every target boots from a fresh snapshot. State
  from one episode never crosses into the next. The snapshot is
  reverted at episode end, not "cleaned."
- **Escape monitoring:** any QEMU exit that is not a clean shutdown
  is logged with full QMP state and the episode is marked `failed`.
  Two unclean exits on the same target image within a release
  window trigger admission-criteria re-verification (§4.3) for
  every module targeting that image.

**Acceptance:** `tests/test_containment.py` asserts each target
build (a) has no upstream egress route from inside the guest,
(b) has no host-shared filesystem mount, (c) runs QEMU as the
unprivileged service user, (d) reverts to snapshot at episode end.
The test runs in CI and on every install.

---

## 5. Build order

There is no half-honest intermediate state. The order below
sequences the work; it does not phase the deployment. Everything
lands to `main` in one merge.

1. Fix the four root-cause defects:
   - Diagnose + fix the perf collector (read code, run standalone,
     find why it's silent, fix).
   - Diagnose + fix the guest-agent collector (mount baseline image,
     verify agent installed, fix build).
   - Diagnose + fix k-gamingcom's missing qmp/netflow/pcap (compare
     configs, eliminate divergence — §4.1).
   - Diagnose + fix `samba_usermap_script` against its target
     (manual msfconsole drive, find why the bind shell never
     connects, fix or remove from catalog — §4.3).
2. Land the canonical manifest (§4.1).
3. Land the target-VM build pipeline (§4.2) and containment
   tests (§4.13) together — target VMs are not in the catalog
   without containment.
4. Land the catalog admission criteria + verifier (§4.3).
5. Land the collector admission criteria + tests (§4.4).
6. Land the event-driven labeller (§4.5).
7. Land the acceptance gate (§4.6).
8. Land the preflight (§4.7).
9. Land the receiver-side rejection (§4.8).
10. Land the override discipline + cleanup (§4.9, §4.12).
11. Land systemd integration + alert distinguishing (§4.11).

After merge: lab hosts pull the new manifest, run preflight, fail
loudly if they don't meet the bar, produce zero episodes until they
do. The operator brings each host to bar — fixing one root cause at
a time, loudly. The dataset goes quiet, then comes back honest.

---

## 6. Out of scope (and why)

- **Schedule jitter for label-leakage resistance.** Real concern,
  but doesn't affect honesty — only generalization. Address after
  honest data is flowing.
- **New collectors (audit, ftrace, etc.).** Adding collectors before
  the existing six are honest is putting more weight on a broken
  floor.
- **Trainer changes.** This plan stops at the dataset boundary. The
  trainer no longer needs to filter dishonest episodes because they
  don't exist.
- **Multi-architecture targets.** All target VMs are x86_64 for now.

Each of these is fine to defer because they don't paper over a
correctness defect. They add value on top of an honest pipeline; the
pipeline isn't honest yet.

---

## 7. Anti-patterns (named — match every proposal against this list)

Each pattern below is a shape a proposal can take that has been
rejected as architectural sleight-of-hand. **Match every proposal
against this list before submitting it.** A proposal that matches
a named pattern is rejected; abandon it and propose a corrective
fix instead.

The patterns are named so future sessions can recognize them in
their own work. A bandaid with a nice name (preflight, acceptance
gate, retry layer, fleet-health) is still a bandaid.

**§7 is non-exhaustive.** New sleight-of-hand patterns will exist
that aren't named here. The §8 decision tests are the actual
filter; a proposal that fails §8 is rejected even if it matches
no named pattern. Do not read §7 as a closed taxonomy and conclude
"my proposal isn't on the list, so it's fine." If §8 says no, the
answer is no, regardless of whether a named match exists.

### 7.1 Compensating-layer pattern

**Definition.** Adding a layer (timer, watcher, retry, alert,
recovery doc) that absorbs a failure mode upstream of itself
instead of fixing the upstream cause.

**Example from session 2026-05-02..03.** `cis490-autoupdate.timer`
to drag stale peers forward. The actual fix was the operator's
deploy process; the timer existed because deployment was unreliable
and we patched around the unreliability instead of fixing it.

**Test.** If I removed this layer right now, would the original
problem reappear immediately? If yes, the layer is a compensating
bandaid for an unfixed root cause.

**What to do instead.** Fix the upstream cause. If you cannot in
this change, fail loudly (§9) and stop.

### 7.2 Phasing-as-deferral pattern

**Definition.** Splitting a correctness fix into "phase 1, phase 2,"
"light vs deep," or "land this now, the harder part later." Any
sequencing that ships a half-honest intermediate state.

**Example from session 2026-05-02..03.** "Land preflight first,
labeller refactor later." The intermediate state ships dishonest
data because the labeller is still clock-driven.

**Test.** Does each intermediate merge ship dishonest data, or
rely on a layer that won't exist yet? If yes, no phasing.

**What to do instead.** Reduce scope (drop a feature, narrow the
active set) until the change is small enough to land in one merge.
Do not defer the hard part.

### 7.3 Single-instance-fix pattern

**Definition.** Fixing one item from a class while leaving the
other items as future work.

**Example from session 2026-05-02..03.** "I'll diagnose perf and
samba in parallel" while guest-agent, qmp, netflow, and the rest
of the module catalog stay broken.

**Test.** Is this a class of N items, of which I'm fixing < N? If
yes, fix all or remove the unfixed from the active set.

**What to do instead.** Either fix every member of the class, or
shrink the active catalog to just the verified members. Unverified
members do not ship.

### 7.4 Per-host-divergence pattern

**Definition.** Accepting that two hosts behave differently as a
working assumption.

**Example from session 2026-05-02..03.** "Which host should I
investigate samba on, elliott or k-gamingcom?" — implying the
answer matters because hosts are different.

**Test.** Given identical workloads on identical canonical-manifest
hosts, would the produced episodes be identical? If no, the
divergence is the bug.

**What to do instead.** Eliminate the divergence (one canonical
manifest, one canonical target VM build, one canonical collector
set — §4.1). If a host can't run the canonical experiment, it
produces zero episodes.

### 7.5 Black-box-trust pattern

**Definition.** Treating an externally-built artifact as if it
behaves correctly under our experiments without a verifiable spec
for what it should do.

**Example from session 2026-05-02..03.** Metasploitable2 from a
SourceForge mirror — we don't know what version of Samba is
running, whether the service is up, or whether the image has been
altered. We were shipping modules targeting it anyway.

**Test.** Do we have a verifiable spec for this artifact's
behavior? If no, we don't trust it.

**What to do instead.** Build the artifact from a declarative spec
we control (§4.2). If we can't, remove modules targeting it from
the catalog.

### 7.6 Investigation-as-deferral pattern

**Definition.** Proposing investigation when a verifiable gate
would suffice. The investigation itself becomes the deferred work.

**Example from session 2026-05-02..03.** "I need to diagnose why
perf is silent before I can write the gate." A gate of the form
"perf must produce ≥1 row" works without knowing the cause; it
forces the diagnosis to happen as part of the fix.

**Test.** Can the gate be expressed as an assertion ("X must
produce > 0 rows" / "X must observe Y event") without knowing the
root cause? If yes, write the gate first.

**What to do instead.** Write the strictest possible gate first.
The investigation is the work of making the gate pass.

### 7.7 Speculation-as-evidence pattern

**Definition.** Asserting a claim as fact without measurement.

**Example from session 2026-05-02..03.** "30s vs 120s won't change
this — if the exploit were almost working, we'd see occasional
opens." No data was gathered; the claim was projected.

**Test.** Do I have a measurement that supports this claim? If no,
I am speculating.

**What to do instead.** Say "I don't know yet." Either gather data
or design the fix to be correct under both possibilities.

### 7.8 Out-of-scope-for-correctness pattern

**Definition.** Naming a correctness-affecting item as "out of
scope" to avoid the harder problem.

**Example from session 2026-05-02..03.** "Manifest canonicalization
is out of scope, flagged as known issue." Per-host config divergence
is the source of half the data quality problems; excluding it from
scope was a deferral.

**Test.** Does excluding this item leave the system half-honest?
If yes, it is in scope.

**What to do instead.** Reduce other scope (drop a feature, narrow
the active set) to fit. Correctness items cannot be deferred.

### 7.9 Defensive-instead-of-corrective pattern

**Definition.** Building rejection logic at the consumer instead of
fixing the producer that produces the rejected output.

**Example from session 2026-05-02..03.** Receiver-side rejection of
dishonest episodes without fixing why the producer produces them.
Defense-in-depth (both ends gated) is good; defense-without-
corrective (only consumer gated) is a bandaid.

**Test.** Does this fix make the dishonest behavior IMPOSSIBLE
upstream, or only unobservable downstream? If only unobservable,
the producer is still broken.

**What to do instead.** Fix the producer first. The consumer-side
gate is defense-in-depth on top of a corrected producer, never a
substitute.

### 7.10 Recovery-layer pattern

**Definition.** Building documentation, scripts, timers, or
runbooks for "what to do when X is stuck." Applies anywhere in
the pipeline — producer, receiver, trainer, dashboard, install
scripts, on-device agents, anywhere a "recovery from a state
that shouldn't exist" layer is contemplated. Producer-side is
just the most common location.

**Example from session 2026-05-02..03.** `FIXYOURSELF.md` — a
250-line decision tree for recovering hosts whose auto-update
timer couldn't fix them. The states it covered shouldn't have been
possible if the producer were correct.

**Test.** Can the stuck state happen at all if the relevant
component is correct? If no, delete the recovery layer and fix
the component.

**What to do instead.** Make the stuck state impossible. If you
can't, fail loudly (§9) and stop.

---

## 8. Decision tests before proposing a change

Before adding any code, doc, layer, or feature, answer all of the
following. **Any uncomfortable answer means stop and re-evaluate.**

1. Does this change make the dishonest behavior IMPOSSIBLE, or
   only less likely / less observable?
2. Does this change scale to every instance of the problem class,
   or only one?
3. If I removed this change, would the underlying problem return
   immediately?
4. Am I adding a layer? If yes, can I instead remove the layer
   that allowed the failure?
5. Does this proposal match any pattern in §7? If yes, abandon it
   and propose a corrective fix.
6. Is the change complete in one merge? If not, why is the
   intermediate state honest?
7. Am I doing this because it's correct, or because it's the
   easiest thing that looks like progress?

If you cannot answer all seven cleanly, stop. Ask the operator.
Do not proceed.

---

## 9. What to do when blocked

When you cannot fix something cleanly in scope:

- **Fail loudly.** Exit with a distinguishable code (e.g., 78).
  Write a structured failure record. Do not retry silently.
- **Stop.** Do not continue producing output as if the failure
  didn't happen.
- **Ask the operator.** Tell the user what's blocked, what you
  tried, and what you need to proceed.
- **Do not build a recovery layer.** That is the recovery-layer
  pattern (§7.10).
- **Do not propose phased fixes.** That is the phasing-as-deferral
  pattern (§7.2).
- **Do not narrow scope silently.** If the active set must shrink
  to make the change tractable, name it explicitly and get sign-off.

The operator prefers a small honest system that fails loudly over a
large half-broken one that limps. A loud failure is more useful
than a silent bandaid.

---

## 10. Definitions of ground truth

For each collector, "real row" means the row was actually emitted
by the underlying mechanism for *this episode*, not synthesized,
defaulted, or carried over from a previous run.

| Collector | Ground truth means |
|---|---|
| `proc` | Row read from `/proc/<qemu_pid>/{stat,io,status}` for the live qemu PID of this episode's target VM, while that PID is alive. |
| `qmp` | Row obtained from a successful QMP `query-status` / `query-blockstats` round-trip on `cfg.qmp_socket` for this episode's qemu PID. |
| `netflow` | Row computed from packet capture on `cfg.bridge_iface` for traffic involving this episode's target VM during the episode wall-clock window. |
| `perf` | Row produced by `perf` (or equivalent) sampling this episode's qemu PID. Not from a previous run, not from a different PID. |
| `guest` | Row received from the in-guest agent over the virtio-serial channel during the episode wall-clock window. The agent must be running in *this episode's* guest, not a stale one. |
| `pcap` | Bytes captured from `cfg.bridge_iface` during the episode wall-clock window, written to `network.pcap`. |

For each phase, "label justified" means the corresponding event was
observed:

| Phase | Justified by |
|---|---|
| `clean` | Episode start (orchestrator-emitted). |
| `armed` | Orchestrator instructs the driver to fire (orchestrator-emitted). |
| `infecting` | `exploit_fire` event observed in `events.jsonl`. |
| `infected_running` | `session_open` event observed in `events.jsonl`. **Not** `session_open_timeout`, **not** schedule-clock. |
| `dormant` | Observed in-session idle (no traffic / no command activity for N seconds). |
| `failed` | `session_open_timeout` or other terminal driver failure. Episode is rejected (§4.6). |

A row that doesn't meet the ground-truth bar is not a row. A label
that isn't justified is not a label. The acceptance gate (§4.6)
enforces both.

---

## 11. Honest reporting

When you (a future session) report status to the operator:

- **Distinguish merged from verified.** "Code merged" is not
  "behavior verified in production." A passing test on a CI host
  is not the same as a working system on a lab host.
- **Distinguish proposed from implemented.** "I proposed X" is not
  "X is in the repo."
- **Audit your cumulative pattern.** At the end of a session,
  re-read your own changes against §7. It is possible to add three
  reasonable-looking layers in sequence that cumulatively form a
  compensating-layer pattern, even if no individual one looks like
  a bandaid.
- **Name compensating layers you've built.** If §7 audit finds
  matches, name them and propose their removal.
- **Don't summarize cumulative changes as "fixes" without
  auditing.** "I shipped 12 commits this session" is not the same
  as "the pipeline is honest now."
- **Verify before agreeing or refuting.** When the operator says
  something is done that you can verify, verify it before agreeing.
  When they say something is broken that you can verify, verify it
  before refuting.

---

## 12. Glossary

Terms used throughout this document, pinned to one definition.

| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| **Canonical manifest** | The single, version-pinned `manifest.toml` at the repo root. Every host loads this exact file. There is no per-host override (§4.1). |
| **Active set** | The collectors enabled in the canonical manifest for a given run. A collector is in the active set only if it has passed admission criteria (§4.4). |
| **Catalog** | The set of exploit modules in `exploits/modules/*.toml` that have passed admission (§4.3). Modules not in the catalog do not run. |
| **Ground truth** | A row or label is ground truth when it was emitted by the underlying mechanism for *this* episode, with the justifying event observed. See §10. |
| **Episode boundary** | An episode begins when the orchestrator emits the first `clean` label and ends when `done.marker` is written or the episode is moved to `rejected/`. All collector rows must fall inside this wall-clock window. |
| **Configured collector** | A collector listed as enabled in the canonical manifest. Distinct from "running collector" (the process actually started) and "active set" (the manifest-listed plus admission-passing intersection). For acceptance purposes, only the configured set matters. |
| **Admission criteria** | The bar a module / collector / target / override knob must pass to be in the active pipeline. See §4.3, §4.4, §13. |
| **Honest** | Of an episode: every label justified by an observed event, every configured collector emitted ≥1 ground-truth row, working tree was clean (or override-stamped), HEAD on `origin/main`. Of the pipeline: every accepted episode is honest. |
| **Bandaid / compensating layer** | A layer that absorbs a failure mode upstream of itself instead of fixing the upstream cause. See §7.1. |
| **Override** | A knob that loosens an admission criterion or gate. There is exactly one — `CIS490_ALLOW_DIRTY` (§14). |
| **Operator** | The human maintainer with sign-off authority. Distinct from agents that propose changes. See §15. |
| **Containment regression** | A change that weakens any of the §4.13 isolation requirements. Rejected regardless of claimed experimental value. |

---

## 13. Admission scope (what triggers the bar)

Any change to the following is in admission scope and must pass §4
admission criteria + §15 operator sign-off:

- Any module in `exploits/modules/*.toml`.
- Any collector in the active set.
- Any field of `manifest.toml`.
- Any phase rule or label-emission code in the labeller.
- Any gate in the producer or receiver.
- Any schedule entry (phase budget, per-module timeout).
- Any target VM build spec or its containment posture (§4.13).
- Any override knob (the closed list in §14).

The following are NOT admission scope and can be changed without
admission ceremony, but must still pass §8 decision tests:

- Internal refactors that do not change observable behavior of
  any of the above.
- Test code, fixtures, CI configuration.
- Documentation that does not contradict §1.
- Build/install scripts, insofar as they don't change what gets
  shipped or how it's labelled.

A future session that argues "this is just infrastructure" or
"this is just tooling" to dodge admission scope: re-read this
section. Anything that touches what gets shipped, how it's
labelled, what runs on the host, the containment posture, or
how the gate decides — is in scope. The "infrastructure /
tooling" framing is a recurring sleight-of-hand vector and
triggers automatic rejection.

---

## 14. Override knobs (closed list)

The complete list of override knobs in CIS490, version-pinned to
this document:

| Knob | Effect | Where audited |
|---|---|---|
| `CIS490_ALLOW_DIRTY=1` (env var, orchestrator) | Allows the orchestrator to start with a dirty git tree. Stamps `dirty_override: true` in every `meta.json` produced. Receiver accepts only with matching stamp. | per-episode in `meta.json` |

That is the entire list. Adding a knob to this list is itself an
admission event (§13) requiring operator sign-off (§15) and an §8
review.

**Knobs that have been considered and rejected** (do not propose
again without re-reading the rationale):

- `verify_tls=false` — TLS verification is a correctness boundary;
  bypassing it is the defensive-instead-of-corrective pattern
  (§7.9).
- `skip_preflight=1` — preflight is the gate; bypassing it makes
  the gate non-functional.
- `experimental_collector=true` — bypassing collector admission
  is the single-instance-fix pattern (§7.3) wearing a flag.
- `diagnostic_mode=true` — generic bypass; in practice would be
  applied to hide failures, not investigate them.
- `dry_run` for the producer — episodes that aren't shipped go to
  `rejected/`; no dry-run flag needed.

If a future session proposes a new override knob, the burden is on
the proposal: pass §8, get operator sign-off, amend §14 in the
same merge. "Add the knob now and amend §14 later" is the
phasing-as-deferral pattern (§7.2) applied to documentation.

---

## 15. Sign-off discipline

Admission decisions are made by the operator, not by agents acting
alone. Specifically:

- **Adding a module to the catalog** requires operator sign-off.
  An agent runs `scripts/verify-catalog.sh`, presents the
  verification result, and the operator decides whether the module
  enters the catalog.
- **Adding a collector to the active set** requires operator
  sign-off. Agent runs the emit-test, operator decides.
- **Promoting a target VM build** requires operator sign-off after
  §4.2 verification and §4.13 containment tests pass.
- **Adding an override knob** (§14) requires operator sign-off.
- **Amending PIPELINE.md** requires operator sign-off (§16).

**Removing** anything from the catalog or active set does NOT
require operator sign-off — the bar is asymmetric. Tightening
is always permitted; loosening requires sign-off.

The operator is the human with maintainer credentials on the
repository. Agents propose, run verification, and present results;
the operator decides admission.

If an agent is acting in a non-interactive context (CI run,
scheduled job) where no operator is available to sign off, the
agent does not admit anything. It produces verification output
and stops.

---

## 16. Amending PIPELINE.md

This document is not immutable, but it is the canonical statement
of the bar. Amendments are governed by the same discipline as
admission decisions:

1. Any change to §1 (principle), §4 (fix items), §7 (anti-patterns),
   §8 (decision tests), §10 (ground truth), §13 (admission scope),
   §14 (override list), or §15 (sign-off) is a substantive
   amendment.
2. Substantive amendments require operator sign-off (§15) and must
   pass §8 decision tests applied to the amendment itself.
3. The amendment lands in the same merge as the code change it
   justifies. "Amend the doc later" is the phasing pattern (§7.2).
4. Editorial changes (typos, formatting, link fixes, glossary
   wording) do not require sign-off but should be flagged in the
   commit message.

A future session that wants to add a feature or layer the document
forbids: the path is to amend the document, not to work around it.
"This isn't covered by PIPELINE.md, so I'll just do it" is the
out-of-scope-for-correctness pattern (§7.8) applied to the
meta-document. Anything that touches admission scope (§13) is
covered even if not named explicitly.

If you find the document is wrong — internally inconsistent,
contradicts observed reality, prescribes something impossible —
file a Forgejo issue against the repo with the contradiction
documented. Do not silently work around the doc.

---

## 17. What this plan supersedes

The following docs are deleted or rewritten as part of landing this
plan:

| Doc | Action |
|---|---|
| `FIXYOURSELF.md` | Deleted. Compensating-layer doc; the states it covers don't exist after §4.6. |
| `AGENTS.md` "symptom→fix table" | Deleted. Bandaid-driven. |
| `AGENTS.md` "Hosts self-update" section | Deleted. Hosts run pinned commits. |
| `AGENTS.md` "Tier 3+4 deploy zero-touch" claim | Rewritten. Targets are built locally now, not auto-fetched. |
| `AGENTS.md` "trust the in-guest probe alone, cross-check host CPU" | Deleted. The producer-side gate makes this fictional cross-check unnecessary. |
| `TIER3-BRINGUP.md` | Kept as historical record — labelled bug report, not current guidance. |
| `README.md` Tier-3+4 narrative | Reviewed and aligned. |

If you are a future session reading this and find another doc that
contradicts §1–§6 of this file: this file is right and the other
doc is wrong. Fix the other doc.
